> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://xao.gitbook.io/xao-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://xao.gitbook.io/xao-docs/getting-started/xaodao-constitution.md).

# XaoDao Constitution

## Preamble

We the members of XaoDAO, in order to build a freer and fairer system for all participants, protect the right to self-sovereignty, ensure transparency and accountability, uphold the value of contribution, safeguard the integrity of open infrastructure, and secure a resilient and permissionless future for all participants, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the governance of XaoDAO.

### Article *I*: Foundational Principles

XaoDAO is built upon six inalienable rights. These form the ideological backbone of its governance, protocol design, and treasury stewardship:

#### Sovereignty

Every [member](#_qklunrcvwt56) of XaoDAO retains absolute control over their assets, identity, and participation. No contract, collective, consensus, or authority — internal or external — may override, intercept, or revoke this sovereignty. All data, funds, and interactions belong wholly to the individual and shall only move or be used with explicit, revocable consent. Participation in XaoDAO is voluntary, reversible, and rooted in informed agency. The protection of privacy, autonomy, and personal authority is not granted — it is inherent.

#### Right to Anonymity and Privacy

XaoDAO affirms the inherent right of every individual to personal privacy across all domains—personal, professional, financial, and otherwise. Every participant retains the right to engage with the DAO and its ecosystem without disclosing real-world identity. No member, contributor, or delegate shall be compelled to provide legal name, address, nationality, or other personally identifying information as a condition of access to any DAO-governed application, service, or governance process.

Participation within XaoDAO shall remain pseudonymous and self-sovereign. Core rights of access and governance shall never require disclosure of personal identity. The DAO may support optional features dependent upon personal data, provided participation is wholly voluntary and at the sole discretion of the individual.

#### Freedom of Expression and Belief

No member, participant, contributor, or delegate within XaoDAO shall be censored, penalized, compelled, or restricted in their expression, communication, belief, or association. All speech — regardless of content, medium, viewpoint, or origin — shall be protected as an inviolable act of individual sovereignty. XaoDAO recognizes no authority, algorithm, contract, or governance mechanism that infringes upon this freedom. The only exceptions shall be provable acts of fraud or direct, intentional incitement of verifiable harm. The right to speak, dissent, create, publish, assemble, and petition within the network is absolute and foundational.

#### Right to Build

Innovation shall never be permissioned. Every member of XaoDAO holds the right to propose ideas, prototype tools, and publish contributions without seeking approval or authorization from any centralized gatekeeper. No [DAO](#_qklunrcvwt56) role, vote, or structure may obstruct the act of creation.

#### Open Infrastructure

All protocols, smart contracts, and operational systems within XaoDAO shall remain open-source and publicly auditable. No part of the DAO’s infrastructure may be hidden, restricted, or artificially scarce. Every member holds the right to inspect, fork, and build upon the code that powers Xao.

#### The Right to Participate

Participation in XaoDAO is earned through action. [Reputation](#_qklunrcvwt56), rewards, and decision-making power flow from provable contribution—not pedigree, proximity, or permission. Every member holds the right to build, to vote, and to shape the future of XaoDAO.

#### Governance Limits

The Constitution of XaoDAO is not a suggestion—it is the bedrock upon which the DAO stands. The rules that define rights, assign powers, or shape the DAO’s structure must not be altered lightly, nor subjected to the tempers of fleeting majorities.

Any [amendment](#_qklunrcvwt56) to this Constitution requires no less than 80% approval, with participation from at least 35% of the [circulating supply](#_qklunrcvwt56). This threshold shall not be lowered by any means.

However, Article I Fundamental Principles shall be fixed and unchangeable. No vote, [quorum](#_qklunrcvwt56), or consensus shall amend or repeal this article. It stands beyond the reach of governance, protecting the very ground upon which governance is built.

***

## Article *II:* Constitutional Stability

The rules that define rights, assign powers, or shape the DAO’s structure should not be easily altered. The Constitution of XaoDAO is not a suggestion—it is the foundation from which all actions of the DAO must flow. No passing mood, majority whim, or political shift shall rewrite the rights that bind us together.

This Constitution governs the [on-chain](#_qklunrcvwt56) entity known as XaoDAO. Any associated legal structures (e.g., LLCs, fiat interfaces) are auxiliary, and shall not override the principles or operations set forth herein.

This document stands above governance. It anchors the DAO in its founding principles—and limits what power can touch.

***

## Article *III:* Structure of Governance

XaoDAO’s governance consists of three distinct bodies:

### Commander

XaoDAO shall elect a single Commander to serve as its strategic leader. This role exists not to rule, but to guide—to illuminate the road ahead, publish public roadmaps, and propose initiatives in alignment with XaoDAO’s evolving vision.

* The Commander holds a fixed 10% vote weight, earned by mandate, not by holdings. Their own tokens do not increase this power, nor may they be used to tilt the scales. Likewise, their personal reputation—though it may accrue and decay as with any member—shall not factor into any vote while they serve. Reputation granted by office is defined by this Constitution, and its limits are absolute.
* The Commander may vote on their own removal—for dignity lies in facing judgment, not dodging it. Their veto power is narrow, limited to blocking consensus only when necessary, and always subject to reversal by a 75% supermajority of the Hodlr Assembly. Removal requires the same threshold: 75% approval with at least 35% of the circulating supply participating.
* If the Commander resigns, is removed, or becomes incapacitated or absent for more than thirty (30) days without communication, the role shall be temporarily fulfilled by the top-reputation holder across all [domains](#_qklunrcvwt56) until a new election is called. The Hodlr Assembly may override this succession by 66% vote.
* Leadership is a role of service. The Commander may lead, but they may not linger. And no power shall outlive the consent that granted it.

### Hodlr Assembly

The [Hodlr](#_qklunrcvwt56) Assembly shall be composed of those who have earned standing within the XaoDAO through provable contribution. Reputation—not association, wealth, or acclaim—shall be the basis of admission. Reputation is acquired through the holding of [$XAO](#_qklunrcvwt56) and through on-chain participation in the XaoDAO ecosystem, including but not limited to event attendance, contract engagement, [staking](#_qklunrcvwt56), and contribution of labor or resources.

* The Hodlr Assembly shall hold the power to govern the DAO. It shall propose and enact resolutions, elect and remove the Commander, approve or reject disbursements from the treasury, and determine all matters of constitutional amendment, replacement, and emergency termination.
* No member of the Assembly, save the Commander as defined herein, shall exercise more than five percent of the total voting power, regardless of token holdings, station, or seniority.
* Voting shall be conducted under a domain-weighted system, whereby each vote is weighted in accordance with the voter’s earned reputation within the relevant domain. Domains shall be defined as spheres of responsibility within the DAO, such as governance, development, and treasury. The Assembly shall possess the authority to establish, amend, or dissolve domains as necessary for the health and operation of the DAO.

### Guardian Council

The Guardian Council exists to uphold this Constitution and ensure that all governance actions remain in alignment with the founding principles of XaoDAO. Guardians do not govern—they guard.

* Their duty is to intervene when governance strays from its rightful bounds. They may block any [proposal](#_qklunrcvwt56) that violates the Constitution, issue non-binding ethical interpretations, offer advisory opinions, and arbitrate disputes through reasoned judgment and historical precedent. Guardian Council decisions require participation from at least one-third of all recognized domain Guardians. Recusal due to conflict of interest must be publicly declared.
* Guardians are automatically selected from among those with the highest reputation scores across distinct domains of contribution, including but not limited to development, operations, community, and marketing. A member who qualifies in multiple domains shall serve in only one, determined by their highest standing. Domains shall be defined, created, and, if necessary, dissolved by the Hodlr Assembly.
* In the event of a tie in reputation score within a domain, the seat shall be awarded to the member with the longest uninterrupted tenure in that domain. If the tie persists, the Hodlr Assembly shall decide the matter by vote. Members may decline the responsibility of guardianship or voluntarily step down. Upon such declination or resignation, the next most reputable eligible member in that domain shall assume the role without delay.
* To ensure stability, a Guardian shall not be displaced by momentary shifts in reputation. A challenger must maintain a higher reputation within the relevant domain for no fewer than one epoch (90) consecutive days before the seat is relinquished. Should the reputation advantage be lost before that time elapses, the challenge is voided and must begin anew.
* Guardians are not stewards of strategy, nor agents of change. They are custodians of principle. Their authority is not derived from popularity or power, but from unwavering fidelity to the Constitution.

***

## Article *IV*: Proposal Lifecycle

In XaoDAO, governance flows not from edict, but from initiative. Every member shall hold the right to propose change, to advance ideas, and to refine the systems that govern us—all through a process that rewards merit, respects caution, and demands accountability.

#### The Right to Propose

Any member of XaoDAO bearing non-zero domain-weighted reputation may introduce a proposal relevant to that domain. Proposals must declare a primary domain of impact. The domain may reject misassigned proposals by vote; the Hodlr Assembly may then resubmit the proposal under a new domain if necessary. Proposers must define an expiration date upon submission. If quorum is not met by expiration, the proposal shall lapse and must be resubmitted. A proposal must be recorded on-chain and accompanied by a reputation [bond](#_qklunrcvwt56), staked by its author, in proportion to the scope of the change and determined by parameters set by the DAO.

This bond shall not be symbolic—it is a stake in the soundness of the idea and a guard against frivolous disruption. Members who act in good faith shall see their bond returned. Those whose proposals fail or are rejected may forfeit a portion of their reputation, redistributed to those whose votes carried the decision.

#### Lazy Consensus: The Default Path

Most governance shall proceed by [Lazy Consensus](#_qklunrcvwt56). When a proposal aligns with the DAO’s public roadmap and incurs no objection, it may be adopted without a formal vote.

* Lazy Consensus proposals must be publicly posted for a minimum of five days. During that time, any member may raise a formal objection. If no objection exceeding 5% of the circulating [domain reputation](#_qklunrcvwt56) is lodged, the proposal shall be ratified.

Lazy Consensus respects the DAO’s rhythm: action without inertia, vision without red tape. It is how we move swiftly when agreement is strong and friction is low.

#### Escalation to Formal Vote

If a proposal receives sufficient objection during the Lazy Consensus window—or if the author chooses to bypass Lazy Consensus altogether—it shall escalate to a formal vote.

* In such cases, all voting participants must stake domain-weighted reputation. The weight of one’s vote shall reflect their standing in the relevant domain, and the outcome shall bind both winners and losers.
* Reputation from those in the minority shall be partially reallocated to those in the majority, preserving fairness and incentivizing discernment.

A formal vote requires:

* A 7-day voting window
* A quorum of 10% of circulating supply (domain-weighted)
* A majority of 51% of votes cast for passage

#### Guardian Oversight and Veto Authority

Guardians shall stand as the Constitution’s defenders. Any proposal—whether through Lazy Consensus or formal vote—may be blocked by the Guardian Council if it violates the founding principles or infringes upon inalienable rights. Such a block shall freeze the proposal until overturned by formal appeal.

The Commander may issue a veto, but this may be overturned by a 75% supermajority of the Hodlr Assembly, provided that 30% of the circulating supply participates in the vote.

#### Integrity Through Reputation

Reputation is the lifeblood of governance. Let those who propose risk it. Let those who vote stake it. Let those who prevail earn more of it. And let those who act without care lose what they have gained.

Governance is a duty, not a right—and every vote is a signal of commitment to the future of XaoDAO.

***

## Article *V*: Reputation Mechanics and Decay

Reputation within XaoDAO shall be earned through verifiable acts of service—governance, operations, and the advancement of the DAO in word and deed. It shall not be bought, sold, traded, or inherited. It is the fruit of contribution, and it belongs to the contributor alone.

* Reputation is domain-bound. It accrues in the domain where the work is done, and its weight is greatest where the member has proven most capable. Though every member may cast votes across domains, only those who have labored in a given domain shall wield the greater voice within it.
* No reputation shall be held in perpetuity. Time-based decay shall apply to all, such that influence fades without continued effort.
* Reputation may be forfeited through verifiable misconduct, manipulation, or harm against the DAO and its members. It may be slashed by rule, by vote, or by any mechanism the DAO shall duly establish for its own defense. The Guardian Council may review suspicious activity suggestive of collusion or synthetic participation. Reputation found to be [Sybil](#_qklunrcvwt56)-manipulated may be nullified upon a 66% Guardian Council vote.
* Reputation granted by office shall be defined and constrained by this Constitution. The Commander shall bear such reputation as is appointed to their station, and no more. While in office, their personal reputation shall be excluded from all voting calculations, but it shall accrue and decay in like manner as any other member’s.

Reputation is not status—it is service made visible. It is not a crown—but a contract between the contributor and the community.

***

## Article *VI*: Treasury and Stewardship

The Treasury of XaoDAO shall be governed by the Hodlr Assembly, whose charge it is to steward shared resources in accordance with the will of the DAO. It is not a vault for the few, but a reservoir held in trust by the many. It exists to fund the work of the DAO, to reward contribution, and to empower bold ideas with measured support. No individual or committee shall hold unilateral authority over its contents.

* Funding proposals may take the form of grants, bounties, recurring payments, or any other structure deemed appropriate by the Hodlr Assembly. They may be raised by any member and shall be subject to approval through Lazy Consensus or formal vote.
* Upon approval, disbursements shall be executed by smart contract. The Assembly shall act not merely as voters, but as signatories to the very transaction by which funds are released. No trusted intermediary shall stand between decision and execution where code can carry the will of the DAO.
* Proposals may include conditions, milestones, or schedules. These, once fulfilled, shall trigger disbursement automatically, without further deliberation. The DAO may establish such verification mechanisms as are necessary to uphold the integrity of this process.
* The Treasury shall operate in full daylight. Reports detailing inflows, outflows, and outstanding commitments shall be published monthly, on-chain, accessible to all, and subject to audit by any member.

The wealth of the DAO belongs to its mission. Let its spending reflect its principles.

#### Reserved Rewards

Tokens set aside for future use—be they for staking rewards, ecosystem growth, or contributor compensation—shall remain under the public eye. Their existence, allocation schedule, and conditions for release shall be reported openly and immutably on-chain.

* Unclaimed staking rewards shall not be lost, but neither shall they remain untouched indefinitely. At the close of each quarter, seventy percent (70%) of all unclaimed staking rewards shall roll forward to the next reward cycle. The remaining thirty percent (30%) shall revert to the Treasury, to be reallocated in service of the DAO.
* The Hodlr Assembly retains the right to amend the terms of this policy. By a simple majority, it may adjust rollover ratios, impose caps, or redesign the reward structure—provided all changes are enacted through the same transparent and participatory mechanisms that govern all Treasury matters.

Let the record show: what is held in reserve is still held in trust.

***

## Article *VII*: On-Chain Transparency

All governance within XaoDAO shall proceed in the open, bound to the chain, and answerable to the record. Every vote cast, every token disbursed, every reputation earned or lost shall be etched in public, [immutable](#_qklunrcvwt56) ledger—visible to all, alterable by none.

No act of power shall hide in shadow. No decision shall find its force outside the chain. [Off-chain](#_qklunrcvwt56) votes shall carry no weight, and secret dealings shall hold no sway. Where privacy is required, justification must be made, and the record preserved.

This ledger is the will of the DAO made visible. It is the safeguard of truth, the shield of accountability, and the mirror in which all power is reflected.

***

## Article *VIII*: Emergency Protocols

In times of peril, when disorder or threat may endanger the integrity of the DAO, the Commander may declare a state of emergency. Such declaration shall not be made lightly, nor stand unchallenged.

* No emergency shall take force without the consent of the Guardian Council, whose duty is to uphold this Constitution and confirm the necessity of such a measure.
* An emergency shall endure no longer than seven days, save by the will of the Hodlr Assembly. It may be renewed only by a vote of no less than sixty-six percent.
* At any time, the Hodlr Assembly may revoke the emergency, thereby restoring ordinary governance and dissolving extraordinary powers.

Let these measures stand not as a path to tyranny, but as a safeguard for order—bound by time, checked by council, and answerable to the will of the DAO.

***

## Article *IX*: Conflict Resolution

Where disagreement arises among members of XaoDAO, or between its organs, recourse may be made to the Guardian Council. The Council shall hear disputes and offer judgments rooted in the principles of this Constitution.

The rulings of the Council shall be advisory, not binding—save where the Hodlr Assembly affirms them through due vote, thereby granting them the force of law.

All processes of conflict resolution shall be guided by fairness, conducted with transparency, and documented in full view of the DAO.

***

## Article *X*: Ethics and Misconduct

All members of XaoDAO are bound by a duty of good faith. They shall act with integrity, avoid self-dealing, and hold the interests of the DAO above private gain.

* Acts of misconduct—including but not limited to fraud, vote manipulation, sabotage, or the abuse of power—shall be subject to investigation by the Guardian Council. Upon such review, the Council may recommend the [slashing](#_qklunrcvwt56) of reputation, removal from office, or any other remedy consistent with this Constitution.
* Members who believe their slashing or reputation penalties were unjust may petition the Guardian Council for review. The Guardians shall conduct an open inquiry and may escalate the matter to the Hodlr Assembly. Upon a 66% majority vote, penalties may be reversed, amended, or upheld. Appeals must be filed within 14 days of the penalty.
* Any member may be removed from elected office by a vote of the Hodlr Assembly, requiring a 75% supermajority. In addition to the Commander’s authority, the Hodlr Assembly may initiate the removal of a Guardian by 66% vote with at least 30% of the circulating supply participating.

Let this power be used with solemn care, for it is not the DAO’s wrath but its resolve that must guard its integrity.

***

## Article *XI*: Amendments

All amendments to this Constitution, save for Article I, must receive no less than 80% approval from those voting, with participation from at least 35% of the circulating supply.

* No amendment shall be allowed that seeks to reduce this threshold or remove the protections outlined in Article I.
* Migration to a new chain or L2 shall not constitute a constitutional amendment if the governance logic, reputation records, and token balances are preserved in function. Migration requires 66% approval with a minimum 35% circulating supply vote. This threshold includes changes to underlying infrastructure or blockchain migration, provided the constitutional content remains intact.
* Proposals that violate this Constitution shall not proceed to a vote. The Guardian Council shall retain authority to reject such proposals, safeguarding the integrity of this founding charter.

***

## Article *XII*: Speech and Platform Policy

XaoDAO affirms without reservation the inalienable right to free expression. No idea, opinion, or form of speech shall be prohibited, censored, or punished solely for its content.

* As a decentralized system, XaoDAO does not—and cannot—enforce centralized moderation. Interfaces built upon the DAO may incorporate filters, ranking systems, or opt-in preferences governed by domain-weighted reputation, but no such mechanism shall constitute censorship, nor shall any expression be forcibly silenced.
* However, the rights of expression do not extend to deception, coercion, or the abuse of DAO infrastructure. Fraud, spam, or the use of speech as a weapon to manipulate governance or defraud participants shall be treated as misconduct, subject to investigation and slashing under the provisions of this Constitution.

Let it be known: liberty demands tolerance, and tolerance requires strength.

***

## Article *XIII*: Delegated Voting

Every member of XaoDAO holds the right to vote—and the equal right to entrust that vote to another. [Delegation](#_qklunrcvwt56) is not abdication, but a deliberate act of representation.

* A delegated vote shall carry the domain-weighted reputation of its originator and shall be counted as such. Delegation shall not create new influence, nor may it be used to bypass the principle of domain expertise.
* No member, regardless of standing, may wield more than five percent of the total voting power of the DAO, whether by personal right or by delegated trust. The protocol shall enforce this limit. Any attempted delegation that would place a recipient above the five percent threshold shall be rejected at the time of submission.
* Delegations shall be recorded publicly and immutably on-chain. They may be revoked at any time, by the will of the member who gave them. Delegation may include private or public incentive agreements. Any payment or compensation must be declared in the delegation metadata and published on-chain. The terms of delegation shall be governed by the Hodlr Assembly.

Let representation be a duty, not a dominion.

***

## Article *XIV*: Domain-Weighted Voting

In XaoDAO, all members may vote upon all matters, for governance belongs to the whole. Yet let it be recognized: those who labor in a field shall hold the greater voice within it.

* A member’s vote shall carry full weight—100%—in the domain where they currently hold the most reputation, referred to as their primary domain. In all other domains, their reputation shall be weighted at no more than 50% during vote calculation.
* Domain-restricted proposals may arise by Lazy Consensus, where the matter concerns only the stewardship of a particular realm.
* Reputation shall wane with time unless renewed by ongoing service.

Thus, authority shall flow not from status, but from relevance.

***

## Article *XV*: Membership and Intellectual Property

A Member is any address holding domain-weighted reputation within the DAO. Reputation is required to participate, vote, delegate, or receive funding. Membership in XaoDAO is not conferred by title, nor purchased by favor—it is earned through proof of stake or act.

* All code authored in the name of XaoDAO shall be open-source, freely inspectable, forkable, and usable under terms consistent with the DAO’s founding ethos.
* All other intellectual property—names, marks, images, events, content, and cultural expression arising from the DAO—shall be held in collective trust. Licensing, where necessary, may be employed to preserve the DAO’s values or to fund its ongoing operations, but no license shall diminish the spirit of shared stewardship.

Membership grants no entitlement, only responsibility.

***

## Article XVI: SubDAOs and Federated Sovereignty

From a single root, many branches may grow. To serve the needs of diverse communities, domains, and endeavors, XaoDAO may charter autonomous [SubDAO](#_qklunrcvwt56)s—each distinct in scope, yet bound in spirit.

#### Charter and Consent

* No SubDAO shall be formed without the explicit consent of the Hodlr Assembly. The formation of a SubDAO shall require a [formal proposa](#_qklunrcvwt56)l, ratified by a simple majority. Such proposal must set forth a charter that clearly defines the SubDAO’s intended purpose and scope, its internal system of governance, its management of funds and tokens, its rights and obligations with regard to shared infrastructure and identity, and its commitment to transparency and public accountability.
* Though each SubDAO may adopt its own structures and processes, all must be rooted in the foundational principles of this Constitution.

#### Powers and Boundaries

* Each SubDAO shall possess autonomy within the boundaries of its charter. It may establish its own tokens, treasury mechanisms, and decision-making structures, provided they remain in alignment with this Constitution and the terms of its ratified mandate.
* All SubDAOs must, at a minimum, publish quarterly reports on-chain, attesting to their financial operations and governance activities.
* If a SubDAO becomes inactive, violates the founding principles, or otherwise dissolves, the Hodlr Assembly may revoke its status and reclaim any allocated resources or reputation by 66% vote.

#### Identity and Trust

* The name and marks of XaoDAO carry with them a solemn duty. Any SubDAO that bears the Xao name or symbol shall be expected to uphold the values of transparency, sovereignty, and ethical conduct.
* Should a SubDAO violate the terms of its charter, misuse the identity entrusted to it, or engage in conduct that threatens the health of the broader ecosystem, it may be suspended or dissolved by a two-thirds (66%) vote of the Hodlr Assembly.

Autonomy is not secession. SubDAOs are sovereign in purpose, yet federated in principle.

***

## Attestation

We, the undersigned members of XaoDAO, affirm this Constitution as the foundational authority of the DAO.

Its legitimacy is not granted by outside forces or majority approval, but by the fact of its enactment — codified, signed, and ratified on-chain. It governs because we have chosen to be governed by it.

Participation gives this document weight. Without members to uphold it, it is only text. But when members act in accordance with it, it becomes law.

By attesting to this Constitution:

* We agree to abide by its rules and processes;
* We accept its terms for change, enforcement, and decision-making;
* We recognize it as the final word in case of conflict or uncertainty.

Once enacted, this Constitution governs the DAO — not because it was voted in, but because we act as if it must.

Let this act of attestation serve as both a signal and a commitment: XaoDAO begins here.

***

## Glossary

<details>

<summary><strong>$XAO</strong></summary>

The native token of XaoDAO. Used for governance, staking, and proposal voting.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Amendment</strong></summary>

A formal change to the Constitution. Requires high approval thresholds to ensure consensus.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Bond</strong></summary>

A deposit of tokens or reputation attached to a proposal or action. Lost if the proposal fails or is rejected.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Circulating Supply</strong></summary>

The portion of tokens held by the public and eligible for voting. Excludes locked or treasury tokens.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization)</strong></summary>

A community-run organization governed by smart contracts instead of a central authority.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Delegation</strong></summary>

The act of giving another member your voting power. Delegation is revocable and capped.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Domain</strong></summary>

An area of focus within the DAO (like Treasury, Events, Development). Used to organize contributions and voting weight.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Domain Reputation</strong></summary>

Reputation earned in a specific domain. Determines voting power for domain-specific proposals.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Epoch</strong></summary>

A defined period of time used for measuring reputation, activity, or distributing rewards.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Formal Proposal</strong></summary>

A structured proposal that meets quorum, is bonded, and goes to a full vote.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Governance Token</strong></summary>

A token (like $XAO) that gives holders voting rights and governance privileges.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Hodlr</strong></summary>

A token holder. In XaoDAO, Hodlrs with activity and reputation may participate in votes.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Immutable</strong></summary>

Once something is written on-chain, it cannot be changed. Applies to votes, delegations, and contracts.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Lazy Consensus</strong></summary>

A form of approval where a proposal is assumed accepted if no strong objections are raised.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Member</strong></summary>

A wallet address with reputation. Members can vote, delegate, and propose actions.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Multisig Wallet</strong></summary>

A crypto wallet that requires multiple people to approve a transaction before funds can move.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Off-chain</strong></summary>

Actions or discussions that occur outside the blockchain. May be recorded later, but not enforced by code.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>On-chain</strong></summary>

Anything executed and recorded directly on the blockchain. Secure, transparent, and verifiable.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Proposal</strong></summary>

A request to take action or change policy. May be informal, lazy, or formal depending on structure.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Quorum</strong></summary>

Minimum number of participants required for a vote to be valid. Prevents small groups from making major decisions.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Reputation</strong></summary>

Non-transferable points earned through meaningful contributions. Used to measure trust and voting power.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Reputation Decay</strong></summary>

A gradual decrease in reputation over time if a member becomes inactive. Keeps governance fresh and fair.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Slashing</strong></summary>

The reduction or removal of a member’s reputation due to misconduct, inactivity, or manipulation.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Snapshot</strong></summary>

A record of token or reputation balances taken at a specific time to determine voting eligibility.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Snapshot Voting</strong></summary>

Voting based on balances or reputation at the time of a snapshot.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Staking / Vote Staking</strong></summary>

Temporarily locking tokens or reputation to vote on or support a proposal.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>SubDAO</strong></summary>

A smaller, semi-autonomous group under the main DAO. May govern a specific project or asset.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Sybil Attack / Sybil Resistance</strong></summary>

A tactic where someone creates many fake accounts to manipulate the system. Sybil resistance prevents this using non-transferable reputation and contribution checks.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Top-Contribution Domain</strong></summary>

The domain where a member holds the most reputation. Their votes carry full weight here.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Treasury</strong></summary>

The collective pool of funds owned and managed by the DAO.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Vote Weight</strong></summary>

The strength of a member’s vote, based on their reputation and domain alignment.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Wallet Address</strong></summary>

A unique identifier on the blockchain that holds tokens and interacts with smart contracts.

</details>

<details>

<summary><strong>Whale</strong></summary>

A user who holds a large share of tokens. In XaoDAO, whale power is capped to preserve balance.

</details>
